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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a) Nature of the Case. 
Goodman Oil Company ("Goodman") appeals the dismissal on summary 
judgment of its breach of contract claim and other related claims against Respondents 
Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. ("Duro-Bilt"), and Bart and Alane McKnight 
("McKnight") ("Respondents" collectively). Appellant contends that Scotty's Duro-Bilt 
Generator, Inc. breached an agreement to vacate First Avenue South in Nampa, Idaho, 
when. it revoked its consent to the vacation, and that as a result of Respondents' 
interference, Goodman's sale of its property failed to close. 
b) Course of Proceedings Below. 
Goodman filed its Complaint in this matter on September 19, 2005, alleging four 
causes of action against the Respondents: (1) breach of contract, (2) tortious interference 
with purchase and sale agreement, (3) negligent interference with prospective economic 
advantage, and ( 4) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. R., p.6. 
On September 29, 2006, the district court dismissed McKnight individually (R., pp. 81-
83), a result of McKnight's 12(b)(6) motion. R., p. 46. On November 7, 2006, the 
district court dismissed Goodman's causes of action two (2) through four (4) but did not 
dismiss Goodman's breach of contract claim. R., pp. 150-153. Duro-Bilt then brought a 
second motion for summary judgment on December 27, 2006, as to Goodman's 
remaining cause of action. The district court granted Duro-Bilt's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 9, 2007. R., pp. 223-224. Goodman moved for reconsideration of 
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this order on February 23, 2007. The district court denied Appellant's Motion for 
Reconsideration on April 2, 2007, in a document entitled "Order." See R, pp. 294-297. 
On June 1, 2007, Respondents moved the court for entry of final judgment P., p 
336. On August 7, 2007, the court entered its Order for Attorney Fees and Costs. R, p. 
348-350. Mindful of I.R.C.P 58(a), Goodman then moved the court to enter a final 
judgment on October 16, 2007. R., p. 355. Respondents opposed the motion and the 
district court ruled on November 15, 2007, that final orders had already been entered and 
that the time for appeal had expired. R., pp. 416-417. 
Goodman filed its Notice of Appeal on November 23, 2007. R., pp. 419-426. 
c) Statement of Facts. 
On August 2, 1995, Goodman entered into a Property Vacation Agreement with 
Duro-Bilt, the Blamires Family Trust, and T. J. Forest, Inc .. R., p. 17. Bart McKnight is 
the president and owner ofDuro-Bilt. R. p. 3 para 12 and R., p. 39, para. 12; R., p. 55. 
In the Vacation Agreement, the parties exchanged mutual promises consenting to 
Nampa's vacation of First Avenue South. The parties granted and conveyed among 
themselves a perpetual easement upon the vacated property for the purpose of access to 
and from their property. The parties agreed to fully cooperate to ensure that the purpose 
and intent of the Vacation Agreement was accomplished, and to equally share in the 
maintenance of the easement in proportion to the amount of property they owned which 
adjoins First Avenue South. R., pp 17-22. 
Prior to vacation, Goodman's property consisted of over 36,800 square feet. 
Blamires' property consisted of over 17,250 square feet. Forest owned 3,750 square feet. 
Duro-Bilt owned a single lot of2,850 square feet. 
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First A venue South, prior to its vacation, ran north and south and was a street of 
eighty (80') feet in width and three hundred (300') feet in length. The actual constructed 
roadway is forty (40') feet in width, back of curb to back of curb. R., p. 54. 
Goodman owns property on both sides of the street. Lots 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 (each 
fifty (50') feet in width) are located on the west side of the vacated street. Lots 4, 5 and 6 
(each fifty (50') feet in width) are located on the east side of the vacated street. R., p. 55. 
Duro-Bilt is the owner of Lot 10 located on the west side of the vacated street. 
Lot 10 is bordered by Goodman property to the north (Lot 11) to the south (Lot 9), and 
following vacation of First Avenue South, to the east. R., p. 55 
On August 3, 1995, Goodman submitted an application to Nampa for vacation of 
First Avenue South. On August 24, 1995, Mr. Holm, Nampa Planning Director, prepared 
a Staff Report. The Staff Report lists the applicant as the adjoining property owners, 
Goodman, Duro-Bilt, Blamires, and Forest. On September 5, 1995, a public hearing was 
held and the Nampa City Council (hereafter "Council") approved the vacation of First 
Avenue South between 2nd Street South and 3rd Street South. R., p. 55-56. 
However, the vacation ordinance ("Ordinance No. 3374") was not approved until 
August 16, 2004. R., p. 58. 
On July 28, 2004, Goodman and James R. Wylie ("Wylie") signed a Purchase and 
Sale Agreement whereby Goodman agreed to sell its property. The sale price was Six 
Hundred Thousand ($600,000) Dollars to be paid in cash at closing. The only 
contingency was completing the vacation of First A venue South in a manner acceptable 
to Goodman and Wylie. R., pp. 56-57. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 3 
In August of 2004, Goodman and Wylie informed Respondents of this sale and 
that the sale was contingent upon the successful vacation of First Avenue South. R., p. 
57. 
On August 4, 2004, the Nampa Fire Department provided written conditional 
approval of development plans for the vacated property and the property owned by 
Goodman. The development plans had been submitted by Goodman's purchaser - Wylie. 
The Nampa Fire Department approved the vacation of First Avenue South subject to a 
dedicated twenty (20') foot wide fire apparatus access road. The Fire Department also 
requested Wylie to obtain the consent, once again, of the adjoining property owners, 
including Respondents. R., p. 57. 
After signing the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement, Wylie visited 
McKnight 3 or 4 times during July and August of 2004. Wylie told McKnight about the 
pending sale and the need to complete the street vacation. It is undisputed that 
Respondents had knowledge of the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement and 
that Respondents knew the sale was contingent upon the vacation of First A venue South. 
R.,p. 57 
Wylie asked Duro-Bilt to sign the consent requested by the Fire Department. 
Wylie will testify that McKnight agreed to sign the consent form presented to him after 
the other property owners signed. After Wylie obtained the consent of the other property 
owners, he returned to Duro-Bilt. Duro-Bilt then refused its consent. R., p. 57. 
Ori August 16, 2004, the vacation ordinance ("Ordinance No. 3374") was 
approved by the Council and the Mayor. R., p. 58. 
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Respondents' efforts to interdict Ordinance No. 3374 began with McKnight 
speaking to a Nampa City Clerk and telling the City Clerk he no longer consented to the 
vacation of First Avenue South and wished to prevent Ordinance No. 3374 from going 
into effect. The City Clerk directed McKnight to call the City Attorney, Mr. White. 
McKnight called the City Attorney that same day and voiced his objections to Ordinance 
No. 3374. McKnight was told by Mr. White that, "they could withdraw this ifI talked to 
the mayor." McKnight then again that same day called Nampa City Hall, spoke to Mayor 
Dale, and explained his objection to the vacation. Mayor Dale agreed to veto Ordinance 
No. 3374. McKnight specifically recalled this exchange in his deposition testimony: "I 
asked him [the Mayor] if there was a way to pull this off of being published, and he said, 
'Yes, I can veto it."' R., pp. 58-59. 
An e-mail dated August 19, 2004, from the City Clerk, Diana Lambing, had the 
following message to deputy clerks at the Nampa City Clerks office: 
Hi Kids! 
Just a little note to let you know that at the Mayor and Terry 
White's direction, I pulled this Ordinance for Vacation of First 
Avenue South from being published. One of the property owners 
is not in agreement anymore. So it is on hold until further notice. 
Thanks. 
R.,p. 59. 
On September 2nd, Mayor Dale vetoed Ordinance No. 3374. It was Mayor Dale's 
only veto since the beginning of his term. This is the only veto seen by Planning Director 
Holm in his 27 years with the City of Nampa. R., p. 59. 
Mayor Dale and McKnight are friends and had been on a ski trip to Sun Valley in 
March of 2004. R., p. 59 
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In his deposition, Mayor Dale confinned McKnight's material, ex parte contact, 
recalling that "he [McKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on that street, he 
did not agree to the vacation at this time." Concerning his decision to veto Ordinance 
No. 3374, the Mayor stated: 
[O]ne of the ways of dealing with this was with a veto. Another 
way was to bring it back before city council. Because, since the 
ordinance had not been published, it had not become law at this 
time. And the city council could have brought it back and 
reconsidered it and voted on it. It was my decision that the most 
expedient way to do it was through the veto. 
R.,p. 60. 
Goodman's transaction with Wylie failed by reason that the vacation had not been 
completed in an acceptable manner. R., p. 60. 
Planning Director Holm stated in his deposition that all that was required from 
the adjoining owners to effect a vacation was a simple note establishing that all adjoining 
landowners had consented. Holm also testified that the Property Vacation Agreement, 
signed by Duro-Bilt, was more formal and detailed than the usual consents received for 
street vacations. Holm knows of no source of authority allowing the Nampa Fire 
Department to request an access easement be reserved in a street vacation ordinance. 
Holm also had no expectation that a detailed easement would be submitted to the City of 
Nampa until such time as the property owner or developer sought a building permit. R., 
pp. 60-61. 
McKnight not only intentionally breached the Property Vacation Agreement but 
also actively undermined Goodman's opportunity to sell its property to Wylie. Goodman 
subsequently filed suit against the City of Nampa to overturn the veto. Goodman 
succeeded in obtaining a writ of mandate ordering the vacation ordinance to be published. 
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See Goodman Oil Company v. City of Nampa, et al., Case No. CV 04-10007. R., p. 11, 
para. 42. Goodman then filed suit against Respondents. 
The companion case of Goodman v. City of Nampa, Supreme Court No. 34284 
· concerns Judge Morfitt's dismissal of McKnight and Duro-Bilt from the original suit. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant raises these issues on appeal: 
a) Did Goodman file a timely Notice of Appeal? 
b) Did the District Court err by dismissing Respondents Bart and Alane 
McKnight? 
c) Did the District Court err by granting Summary Judgment to 
Respondents Duro-B ilt? 
d) Did the District Court err by awarding attorney's fees to Respondents 
and is Goodman entitled to attorney fees in this appeal? 
III. 
APPLICABLE ST AND ARDS 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment this Court's standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for 
summary judgment. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg!. Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 
1142, 1146 ( 1997). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and 
discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the 
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nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 
126, 127 (1988) (citing !.R.C.P. 56(c)). "In making this determination, all allegations of 
fact in the record, and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion." City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain 
Interests Ltd., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000). If the evidence reveals no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, then all that remains is a question oflaw over which 
this Court exercises free review. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175, 
923 P.2d 416,420 (1996). 
The standard for review of a 12(b)(6) motion is the same as that applicable to 
motions for summary judgment. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.2d 
1157, 1159 (2002). 
a) 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Goodman's Notice Of Appeal Was Timely. 
The district court found that a final judgment was entered in this case on April 2, 
2007, when the district court rejected Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Following the April 2, 2007 decision the district court failed to grant Respondent's and 
Goodman's Motion for Entry of Judgment. The district court erred. 
Goodman asserts that the district court's April 2, 2007, decision is not a final 
judgment because of the "separate document" requirement of!.R.C.P. 58(a) and therefore 
no final judgment has been entered in this case. 
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Respondents brought their Motion for Entry of Judgment on June 1, 2007. R., pp. 
334-344. The district court did not rule on Respondents' Motion for Entry of Judgment. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) sets forth the time for taking an appeal from the 
district court and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Any appeal as a matter of right from the district court may be made 
only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
district court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing 
stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment, order or decree of 
the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil 
action. 
I.R.C.P. 58(a) provides for the entry of a final judgment from which an appeal 
lies, stating: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b ): 
(2) upon a decision by the court granting other relief ... , the court 
shall approve the. form and sign the judgment, and the clerk shall 
thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate 
document. 
The present Rule 58(a) was adopted in 1992. The Reporter for the Supreme 
Court Rules Committee explained the reasons for the 1992 amendment as follows: 
4. Rule 58( a) - This is a substantial amendment to this rule 
dealing with the method of an entry of judgment. The impetus for 
this rule arose in the Appellate Rules Committee which found that 
in recent years there have been a number of situations in which the 
Supreme Court has ruled that a memorandum decision of a trial 
court was in fact a "final judgment" from which the time to appeal 
commenced to run. Quite a number of attorneys have been caught 
off base with this as they did not file the notice of appeal within 42 
days of the memorandum decision . .. For all of these reasons, the 
Appellate Rules Committee felt that the rule should be amended so 
that there must be a separate judgment document so that all parties 
will know that the time to appeal has commenced to run. The 
Appellate Rules Committee therefore suggested that this rule be 
amended, and the Civil Rules Committee concurred, so as to 
amend the rule to adopt language out of the corresponding federal 
rule that "Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate 
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document." If a memorandum decision grants a motion for 
summary judgment, that [sic} this must be followed by a judgment 
which has to be set forth on a separate document. 
L. Davis, Highlights of 1992 Rules Changes, The Idaho State Bar Advocate, Vol. 35, No. 
6, (June 1992), pullout section at 5. 1 
This Court has dealt directly with the meaning and application of the "separate 
document" requirement in I.R.C.P. 58(a). In Hunting v. Clark County School Dist., 129 
Idaho 634, 931 P .2d 628 (1997), the respondent/defendant therein claimed 
appellant/plaintiffs appeal was untimely given appellant's appeal was filed more than 42 
days after the district court entered an "'Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment,' stating that '[p]laintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice,' 
[ which according to respondent/defendant] served as a judgment set forth on a separate 
document, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 58(a)." See Id. at 637, 931 P.2d at 631. This Court found 
that such an order was not "a judgment set forth on a separate document" as required 
1 As noted in the Advocate article, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 contains the identical 
requirement of Idaho Rule 58(a) that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document." In 
reversing a lower court decision holding an appeal untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a), the United States Supreme Court discussed the purpose behind the inclusion of the separate judgment 
requirement in Federal Rule 58, stating as follows: 
Prior to 1963, there was considerable uncertainty over what actions of the 
district court would constitute an entry of judgment, and occasional grief to 
litigants as a result of this uncertainty. (Citations omitted.) To eliminate these 
uncertainties, which spawned protracted litigation over a technical procedural 
matter, Rule 58 was amended to require that a judgment was to be effective only 
when set forth on a separate document. 
The separate document provision . . . "was needed to make certain when a 
judgment becomes effective which has a most important bearing, inter alia, on 
the time for appeal ... " (Citation omitted.) 
United States v. Indrehmas, 411 U.S. 216,220 (1973); citing 6A J. Moore Federal Practice 58.04 
(4. - 2) at 158-161 (1972); see also Allah v. Superior Court, 871 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1988) where the Ninth 
Circuit held that "[a] judgment or order is not entered within the meaning of Rule 4(a) ... unless it is 
entered in compliance with Rule 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and "[a]bsent 
compliance with these requirements, 'a party will not ordinarily be found to have exceeded any of the time 
periods set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). "' Id. at 889. (citations omitted.) 
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under I.R.C.P. 58(a). Id. This Court found that the document constituting the final 
judgment in the case was the separate document entered several months later by the 
district court that was entitled "Judgment." Id. The Court found, therefore, the 
Appellant's appeal was timely. Id. 
The rule that a final judgment must be a "separate document" was also examined 
in Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002) - a case 
analogous to this one. In Camp, the district court had entered partial judgments in favor 
of the respondent/defendant on all claims in the case except the appellant/plaintiffs 
cause of action for malicious prosecution. Id. at 866, 55 P.3d at 320. Later, the district 
court entered an order on November 24, 1999, stating, "Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Malicious Prosecution Claim is hereby GRANTED," and the 
respondent/defendant submitted a memorandum of costs for prevailing on that count. 
Id. at 867, 55 P.3d at 321. The appellant/plaintiff objected on the ground that it was 
untimely because it was filed more than 14 days after the above final judgment (as 
characterized by the appellant/plaintiff) was entered as required under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5); 
the district court agreed. Id. at 866, 55 P.3d at 320. This Court overruled the district 
court and held: 
The order simply granting summary judgment does not constitute a 
judgment dismissing a count [ for malicious prosecution] in Camp's 
second amended complaint. Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. 
No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,931 P.2d 628 (1997). Although the partial 
judgments previously entered by the district court resolved counts 
one, two, four, and five of the second amended complaint and the 
counterclaims, there was no final judgment until a judgment was 
entered resolving count three [ of malicious prosecution] of the 
second amended complaint. That judgment was not entered until 
May 23, 2002. Therefore, the amended memorandum of costs filed 
by the Ditch Company on December 22, 1999, was timely. 
Although it was filed before entry of a final judgment, a 
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memorandum of costs prematurely filed is considered timely. 
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 
466, 36 P.3d 218 (2001); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d)(5). 
Id. 368, 55 P.3d 322 (footnote omitted). 
The separate judgment requirement was also recently considered by this Court in 
In re Universe Life Ins. Co., --P.3d --, 2007 WL 914049, Idaho 2007, Opinion No. 
31194. Therein, the district court made two partial rulings via summary judgment and 
this Court found neither constituted "a final judgment because neither it nor the earlier 
memorandum decision and order constituted a judgment. They were simply orders 
granting summary judgment." Id. at p. 9. Specifically, this Court stated: 
An order granting summary judgment does not constitute a 
judgment. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 
P.3d 304 (2002); Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 
129 Idaho 634, 931 P.2d 628 (I 997). "Every judgment shall be set 
forth on a separate document." I.R.C.P. 58(a); accord, Hunting v. 
Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634, 931 P.2d 628 
(1997). 
In this case, the district court's April 2, 2007, document entitled "Order" was not 
a judgment. Neither party treated it as an appealable Order. Respondent moved for 
entry of judgment following the April 2, 2007 Order. It was simply an order denying 
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and no language in the order states the case is 
resolved. R., pp. 294-297 
For there to have been a final judgment in this case the district court, as in Camp, 
had to file a document that specifically ended the lawsuit, declared the entire subject 
matter of the controversy adjudicated, and represented a final determination of the rights 
of the parties. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). This was not done 
by the district court despite the fact that both parties requested a judgment be entered. 
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This case is analogous to Camp and In re Universe Life Ins. Co. The April 2, 
2007, Order was not a "separate document" that signaled the type of finality that I.R.C.P. 
58(a) envisions as triggering the time for appeal. Goodman's appeal is timely. 
b) The District Court Erred In Dismissing Bart & Alane McKnight As Respondents. 
The district court dismissed Bart and Alane McKnight as Respondents in the case 
because it found " ... that Plaintiff has not shown that the Court should pierce the 
corporate veil. .. " and hold them individually responsible for the acts of Duro-Bilt. See 
R., p. 81. The district court's order dismissing McKnights individualJy was based upon 
the courts belief that Goodman had failed to present evidence which would justify 
"piercing the corporate veil" of Respondent Duro-Bilt. R., p. 81. 
Count I of the Complaint alleges a breach of the Property Owner's Vacation 
Agreement dated August 2, 1995 between Goodman and Defendant Duro-Bilt. 
McKnight was not a party to this agreement. Paragraph 3 of Goodman's Complaint 
alJeges that" ... Defendants McKnight were the alter egos of Defendant Duro-Bilt." R., p. 
2. This alJegation was denied by Defendants. R., p. 38. 
The other three counts of Goodman's Complaint are tort theories alleging 
interference with contract. The contract interfered with was not the Property Owner's 
Vacation Agreement referred to in Count I. The contract interfered with is the 
Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement dated July 28, 2004. The tortious 
interference alJegations of Counts II, III and IV are made against all Respondents. R., pp. 
6- 10. These tortious theories of recovery have their own elements and do not include 
"piercing the corporate veil." 
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In a case dealing with similar issues, Davis v. Professional Business Servs., 109 
Idaho 810, 813, 712 P.2d 511, 514 (Idaho 1985), substituted opinion at Magic Valley 
Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Professional Business Servs., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 
(Idaho 1991), the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished between tort and contract cases 
with regard to the issue of piercing the corporate veil. "Piercing the corporate veil" is a 
prerequisite for holding a corporate officer personally liable under a contract with the 
corporation. In this case issues of piercing the corporate veil apply to Count I. 
A prima facie case of tortious interference with a contract exists where a plaintiff 
has established: (a) the existence ofa contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on part of 
the defendant, ( c) intentional interference causing breach of the contract, and ( d) injury to 
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. lnt'l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881,893, 
522 P.2d 1102, 1115 (1974). 
Goodman's tortious interference counts are directed at McKnight for his tortious 
conduct both as an individual and as the alter ego ofDuro-Bilt. 
It is undisputed that McKnight is the individual who instigated the veto causing 
the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement to fail. The district court erred in 
dismissing McKnight from the case. 
c) The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment As To Duro-Bilt. 
After the McKnights were dismissed from the case, Duro-Bilt moved for 
summary judgment in two stages. The district court granted those motions and dismissed 
the remainder of Goodman's complaint. See R., pp. 150-152, pp. 223-224, pp. 294-298. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 14 
i. Breach of Contract. 
The district court dismissed Goodman's breach of contract claim on the grounds 
that no breach had occurred as of the time of Duro-Bilt's motion as First Avenue South 
had not been vacated and because Duro-Bilt was not responsible for the Mayor of 
Nampa's illegal veto of Ordinance No. 3374. The district court also found that Duro-
Bilt's request to the Mayor of Nampa to veto Ordinance No. 3374 and thus sabotage 
Goodman's deal with Wylie did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
See Reporter's Transcript, January 25, 2007, pp. 104-105. The district court's findings 
are in error. 
There is no dispute that the Mayor of Nampa vetoed Ordinance No. 3374 only 
because of Respondent's request. The district court's finding is contrary to the facts and 
stands instead of a decision that should have been made by a jury. 
Second, the Vacation Agreement was breached by Duro-Bilt's conduct. On page 
two of the Vacation Agreement it states that the "parties consent to the City ofNampa's 
vacation of First Avenue South .... " R., p. 18. Duro-Bilt breached the agreement when it 
withdrew its consent to the vacation of First Avenue South. It was Duro-Bilt's intent and 
purpose to withdraw its consent and prevent the vacation it had agreed to. 
Third, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached. A provision of 
the Vacation Agreement states that "the parties shall fully cooperate to ensure that the 
purpose and intent of this agreement shall be accomplished." R., p. 18. Again, it is not 
disputed that Respondents sought to prevent the vacation of First Avenue South and 
contacted the Mayor of Nampa to prevent Ordinance No. 3374 from going into effect. A 
breach of this covenant occurs when a party takes any action which "violates, nullifies, or 
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significantly impairs" the rights or benefits due under the existing contract. Idaho First 
Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991). 
Respondent's conduct is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, the district court's finding that First Avenue South had not yet been 
vacated was also in error. Judge Morfitt entered bis decision on the Writ of Mandamus 
on August 7, 2005 in the companion case of Goodman v. the City of Nampa, Case No. 
CV 04-10007. R., pp. 34-35. On April 27, 2007, Judge Morfitt in the companion case, 
awarded Goodman $40,000 in attorney's fees and entered a Preliminary Injunction 
against Nampa prohibiting it from proceeding with obtaining consents, proceeding or 
scheduling any public hearing or proceeding in any other manner which is inconsistent 
with previously obtained consents to vacation and completed vacation of First Avenue 
South between Second and Third Streets South in the City of Nampa. R., pp. 302-315 
The time for performance under the Vacation Agreement was August of 2004. 
Duro-Bilt was asked to meet its contractual obligations by cooperating and consenting to 
the vacation of First Avenue South. Instead, it refused to cooperate, instigated an illegal 
veto of Ordinance No. 3374, and has held the development of this downtown Nampa 
parcel hostage. The district court's ruling that Duro-Bilt's time for perfonnance under 
the Vacation Agreement was not ripe is wholly erroneous and not supported by the 
record. 
In the companion case, Judge Morfitt's Order of April 25, 2007 contains the 
following: 
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Consent of all adjoining property owners to the vacation of 
First Avenue South was given prior to passage of Ordinance 
No. 3374 in the Property Owners Vacation Agreement, an 
original of which is found in the Nampa Planning 
Department's file on this vacation. 
Consent of the adjoining property owners to the vacation of 
First Avenue South is not an issue to be considered or 
addressed in determining expedience of the public good. 
(emphasis added) R., p. 307, paras. e and d. 
In the companion case, Judge Morfitt went so far as to enter a Preliminary 
Injunction against the City of Nampa from soliciting consents. R., p. 308, paras. e and d; 
R., pp. 313-314. 
This litigation is the result of Duro-Biit's breach of the contract in which it 
consented to the vacation of First Avenue South. That is the starting point. Duro-Bilt's 
breach of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement led to Duro-Bilt's and McKnight's 
interference with the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. This entire dispute 
would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the contractual terms it agreed to 
in the Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement. Duro-Bilt's breach of that contract 
and McKnight's interdiction of Ordinance No. 3374 cause the Goodman/Wylie Purchase 
and Sale Agreement to fail. 
ii. Tortious Interference. 
The district court dismissed Goodman's count of tortious interference with 
contract against Duro-Bilt because it found that the reservation of a 50 foot easement in 
the Vacation Ordinance was what caused Goodman's deal with Wylie to fail and not the 
veto of Ordinance No. 3374. Therefore, according to the district court, Duro-Bilt was not 
responsible for the failure of the Goodman/Wylie deal. See Reporter's Transcript, 
October 24, 2006, pp. 71-72, Ins. 5-10. 
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Goodman contends this was an error. Tortious interference with contract has four 
elements: (1) the existence ofa contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the part of the 
defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract; and (4) injury to 
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 
121 Idaho 266, 283-84, 824 P.2d 841, 858-59 (1991) (citing Barlow v. Int'! Harvester 
Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974)). The district court ruled on the 
third element, holding as a matter of law that Duro-Bilt did not cause the interference. 
Yet the issue of causation is usually a question of fact for the jury. Garrett Freightlines, 
Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987). Goodman 
contends there is an issue of fact as to whether the sale with Wylie failed because of the 
50 foot easement or because of the veto of Ordinance No. 3374. This issue of fact 
precludes the entry of summary judgment. 
The district court merely supplanted its judgment for that of a fact finder over a 
disputed issue, i.e. the cause of the failure of the Goodman/Wylie deal. Indeed, 
Goodman later successfully had the 50 foot easement removed from Ordinance No. 3374. 
This Court should reverse the district court and allow this issue to be resolved before a 
jury. 
d) The District Court Erred In Awarding Attorney Fees To Respondents; Goodman 
Is Entitled To An Award Of Attorney Fees On Appeal. 
The district court awarded Duro-Bilt attorney's fees in this case. If Goodman 
prevails on any of the issues on appeal the award of attorney's fees below must be 
vacated as the Respondents will no longer be the prevailing party. 
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Goodman is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to LC. § 12-
120(3) in the event it prevails in this appeal. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the dismissal of Goodman's causes of action (Counts I 
and II) against Respondents. Goodman should also be awarded attorney fees and costs as 
the result of this appeal. Finally, the case should be remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this~ day of November 2008. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: J/1 c;;TJ 
---~+----------JON M.'STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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